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The main focus of this article is on how the Swedish mainstream parties on the centre-left and 
the centre-right have dealt with the immigration issue. After brief overviews of trends in 
immigration and public opinion, the history of immigration in Swedish politics since the 
1980s is discussed. It is argued that the 2002 election campaign was of pivotal importance for 
a number of reasons; most importantly because it politicised labour immigration. The main 
empirical part consists of a qualitative content analysis of 25 election manifestos from 2002, 
2006 and 2010. The analysis shows a clear difference between the mainstream parties and the 
Sweden Democrats. More importantly, there are differences also among the mainstream 
parties, in terms of the relative amount of space devoted to immigration as well as substantive 
content. This is most evident on the centre-left. There is more coherence on the centre-right, 
but also here underlying tensions can be detected. Thus the issue of immigration has the 
potential to destabilise the two main political blocs, as well as the entire party system. 
 
 





1. Introduction  
 
The economic left-right dimension has proved resilient in Swedish politics. Environmental 
issues began to make an impact in the 1980s, but after initial difficulties the established 
parties adapted to them relatively successfully. Immigration has proved more problematical. 
It is emotive, and tends to polarise opinion, which makes it both difficult to handle 
pragmatically and susceptible to populist exploitation. Immigration cuts across both the 
economic left-right as well as the GAL/TAN dimensions, because it touches on a wide range 
of policy fields, such as the economy, labour market, welfare system, education, culture, law 
and order, etc. (compare Hooghe et al 2002; 2010). This can lead to dilemmas for mainstream 
parties to the left as well as right, especially if a distinction is made between different kinds 
of immigration. Centre-left parties like to portray themselves as opponents of ethnic 
intolerance and defenders of international solidarity, but are prone to a protectionist position 
on labour market issues. Centre-right parties, on the other hand, see themselves as champions 
of individual freedom and the right to move across borders, but also as defenders of national 
values. Both sides operate within a meta-ideological frame sometimes referred to as “political 
correctness”, but are subject to internal as well as external pressures towards more restrictive 
immigration policies. 
 
This article has two main parts. First, it outlines some key events in the Swedish immigration 
debate. Second, it provides a content analysis of the parties’ election manifestos from 2002, 
2006 and 2010. In the process, attempts will be made to test the three hypotheses presented in 
the introductory article. All eight parties represented in parliament after the 2010 election will 
be analysed, including the Sweden Democrats (SD), although the latter party was not in 
parliament before 2010. Emphasis, however, will be on the other seven parties, which will be 
referred to as the mainstream parties. These will, in turn, be separated into two main groups. 
The centre-left parties comprise the Social Democrats (SAP), the (post-communist) Left 
Party and the Greens. The centre-right parties are the Moderate (conservative) Party, the 
People’s Party Liberals (referred to as the “Liberal Party” or “Liberals”), the Christian 
Democrats and the (formerly agrarian) Centre Party.  
 




As shown in Figure 1, Sweden a country of high immigration. Non-Nordic labour 
immigration was abolished in 1972, but since the 1980s there has been a steady influx of 
asylum seekers. The figure reports asylum applications as percentages of the population, 
which have never reached on per cent in a year. The proportions are still high compared to 
many other countries, and over the 1985-2013 period Sweden is one of the main asylum 
recipients in Europe. The absolute numbers (not reported in the figure) reached an early peak 
of 84,000 in 1992, followed by a steep but temporary decline. Since 1998 the number has not 
been below 10,000, and since 2005 not below 20,000. The 2013 figure of 54,000 was the 
highest since 1992. It goes without saying that the Swedish population has been affected. In 
the late 1990s nearly eight per cent of the population were born outside the Nordic region 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden); in 2013 the proportion had grown to 13 
per cent. The most common non-Nordic country of birth in 2013 was Iraq, followed by 
Poland, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia.  
 
Research by Demker (2012) indicates a long-term development towards less negative 
attitudes to refugee immigration. Without exception, however, Demker’s data show clear 
pluralities of ‘refugee-negative’ responses throughout the 1990-2011 period. In other words, 
immigration is by no means uncontroversial in Sweden. The trend may well have been 
towards less negativity, but the mainstream parties cannot be relaxed about the situation. This 
is also reinforced by the levels of trust in the parties’ refugee and immigration policies. 
Election Studies data suggest that none of the mainstream parties is highly trusted in these 
areas. In relative terms the Social Democrats and Liberals are the most trusted parties, but 
both are significantly more trusted in several other issue areas. (Holmberg & Oscarsson 
2004:132; Oscarsson & Holmberg 2013:209).  
 
2. The immigration issue in Swedish politics – some key events 
 
For many years, immigration was not a politicised issue. In December 1989, however, a 
Social Democratic government tightened Swedish asylum policy. In essence, the decision 
was to give asylum only to those who were classed as refugees according to the UN 
convention on refugees from 1951. This meant that “de facto refugees”, including those who 
had refused military service, were no longer eligible for asylum, unless they could claim 
“special needs”. It was a government decision, not voted on in parliament, but subject to a 
parliamentary debate. Moderate and Centre Party representatives supported the decision, 
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while speakers from the Liberals, Greens and the then Left Party Communists were critical 
(Abiri 2000:15; Riksdag minutes 1989/90:46; section 9). The decision was also subject to 
much media debate, and criticism from pro-immigration campaign groups. At the time of the 
1989 decision, no immigration-critical party of any significance existed. In 1991, however, 
the newly formed New Democracy (NyD) entered parliament. Immigration criticism was part 
of the NyD agenda from the outset, and the rhetoric intensified some time after the 
parliamentary entry (Rydgren 2006:54). The other parties responded with unanimous 
condemnation. If anything, the arrival of NyD on the scene seemed to force the mainstream 
parties closer together. Disagreements about immigration policy, which had surfaced after the 
government decision in December 1989, were toned down.  
 
A centre-right minority coalition, which took office after the 1991 election, withdrew the 
restrictions introduced in 1989. This was a concession to the Liberals, who had been the only 
party to take the debate to New Democracy in the 1991 campaign, and in general had an 
immigration-tolerant profile. The Liberals were also put in charge of migration in the new 
government. This soon turned out to be a poisoned chalice, however, with unprecedented 
numbers of asylum seekers arriving from the Balkan countries. The Liberals, who in 
opposition had criticised the SAP government for being too restrictive, were soon subject to 
similar criticism (Abiri 2000:19). Decisions in 1992 and 1993 were taken to stem the influx 
of Balkan refugees, essentially by making entry into Sweden subject to visa for citizens of the 
remaining Yugoslavia and, later, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The latter decision was coupled with a 
general “amnesty” for most of the circa 40,000 Bosnian refugees waiting to have their 
applications processed (Abiri 2000:20). The double-sided character of the decision prompted 
criticism from all sides, but it did have the intended effect. The numbers of asylum 
applications sank in the second half of the 1990s.  
 
The Social Democrats returned to power in 1994, and introduced a new overhaul of refugee 
policy, which took effect in 1997. According to the government, the changes were intended 
to remove ambiguities in the system, but critics argued that this in practice amounted to a 
toughening of the regulations. The reforms included more restrictive criteria for asylum, 
along very similar lines to the restrictions introduced in December 1989. In addition, the 
criteria for family reunification were tightened. This time, however, the reforms were decided 
by parliament, and made into law. The government bill was supported by the Moderate, and 
in part also Centre, parties (Abiri 2000:22ff). New Democracy had been annihilated in the 
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1994 election, but back in office the Social Democratic government continued what many 
saw as a tough line on immigration (Rydgren 2004). Without too much simplification, the 
positions in the 1990s were that SAP and the Moderates pursued the most restrictive policies. 
These have been Sweden’s two biggest parties since the late 1970s, and together they have 
for many years commanded a comfortable parliamentary majority. On economic issues they 
are traditional adversaries, and the fact that they were close together in any issue area was not 
something either party sought to publicise. The Centre Party was in an intermediate position, 
while the Christian Democratic, Green and Left parties favoured more generous immigration 
policies. This also applied to the Liberals, despite the party’s difficult experience as 
responsible for government migration policy 1991-1994. 
 
Immigration received limited attention in the 1998 election. A month and a half before the 
2002 election, however, the Liberal Party presented an immigration and integration policy 
package, which transformed the party’s earlier image as “soft” on immigration. Arguably the 
most discussed proposal was the introduction of a language test as a criterion for Swedish 
citizenship. Such a requirement had in fact existed earlier, but not been rigorously applied 
and was dropped in the early 1980s (Rooth & Strömblad 2008:33). The proposals also 
included measures against immigrant unemployment. Immigrants who could present an offer 
of employment would immediately be given a temporary residence permit, which would 
become permanent after five years. In the meantime, however, the immigrant would not be 
eligible for the full range of welfare provisions, and would be forced to leave if the 
employment was lost (Dagens Nyheter, 2002b; Widfeldt 2003). In other words, labour 
immigration (which in practice had been abolished by an SAP government in the early 1970s) 
was a key part of the Liberal package.  
 
The proposals led to an intense debate. It must be remembered that they were not designed to 
reduce immigration – the consequences could just as well be increased immigration. 
Nevertheless, the Liberals set a number of criteria for the acceptance and retention of 
immigrants, which gave the party a new image of toughness. It may, therefore, be more 
accurate to say that the package amounted to more generous immigration policies, but stricter 
integration policies (compare Hinnfors et al. 2012, who distinguish between entry policy and 
integration policy). In the debate, however, this distinction tended to be overlooked and there 
is much to suggest that the proposals went down well with immigration-sceptical voters. This 
led to rather mixed feelings in the party, and in other election material the toughened 
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demands on immigrants were combined with denouncements of racism and intolerance, 
expressions of support for multiculturalism and advocacy of a more generous refugee policy 
(Liberal Party, 2002b).  
 
The Liberals had struggled in the polls before the 2002 election, but the ratings improved 
after the immigration and integration policy package had been presented. In the election the 
party almost trebled its number of seats, and came close to overtaking the Moderates as the 
second biggest party. Available evidence suggests that the immigration and integration policy 
package was, at least, a contributory factor to the Liberal success (Holmberg & Oscarsson 
2004:126ff). It also meant that immigration and integration became important campaign 
issues. To an extent, however, this applied to the media and the political elites rather than 
voters in general. As can be seen from Table 1 below, voters’ prioritisation of immigration 
did increase in 2002, but it was still behind health care, education and pensions/elderly care. 
Other data sources indicate that voters gave immigration/integration issues even lower 
priority (Widfeldt 2003:781).  
 
The 2002 election remains the most centred on immigration and integration to date. It is 
worth remembering that no immigration-critical party posed any serious challenge at the 
time. New Democracy had been irrelevant since 1994. The Sweden Democrats made some 
gains in the 2002 election, but were still far from a national breakthrough. Thus, the decision 
by the Liberals to position themselves as “hardliners” on immigration policy was not driven 
by any perceived threat from an outsider party. A possible background factor could be the 
terrorist attacks on the USA a year earlier, but warnings against terrorism or religious 
extremism did not feature in the party message. Another possible influence could be the 
liberal sister party Venstre in Denmark, which had pursued restrictive immigration as well as 
integration policies after taking office in 2001. Against this it could be argued that the 
Swedish Liberals did not follow the Danish restrictions on refugee immigration. In addition, 
the Swedish party was – and is – very critical of Venstre’s support party, the Danish People’s 
Party. Indeed, the Swedish Liberal leader Lars Leijonborg participated in a heated TV debate 
with Danish People’s Party leader Pia Kjærsgaard in May 2002 (Dagens Nyheter, 2002a). 
Rather, it seems that the Liberal repositioning was driven by negative opinion poll ratings. 
The strategy worked very well in the short term, and the election was a resounding success. 




The longer-term significance of the 2002 election could be summarised in three points. First, 
the Liberal Party changed its profile on immigration. Although, as we have seen, the party’s 
position cannot straightforwardly be termed as restrictive, this was the perception among the 
voters, and it marked a clear contrast to the public profile the party had previously adopted. 
The substantively new element was that the openness to immigration remained was combined 
with demands, where immigrants able to quickly integrate into the labour market are 
rewarded. The party itself summarised the new position with the catchword “clarity” (for 
examples, see Backman 2006; Haddad 2012). It fits with a broader image of the party as 
“clear” in other areas, for example emphasising knowledge and discipline in schools. Second, 
the 2002 election was the first in which a mainstream party consciously and publicly 
emphasised immigration and integration issues. Other parties had done so at the local level, 
and individuals in several parties had voiced concerns about immigration. As discussed, 
restrictions on immigration had been government policy already in the 1980s. No party had, 
however, previously adopted a public profile characterised by “clarity” the way the Liberals 
did in 2002. Third, the 2002 election could be seen as the starting point for the distinction 
between labour and refugee immigration in the political debate. As such, this distinction was 
not new – the Moderates had for many years advocated more openness to labour immigration 
(Odmalm 2011:14f). It had not, however, been politicised to nearly the same extent, and 
never featured as prominently in the election debate. The Liberal Party did not seek to 
politicise immigration in general – what they did was to politicise integration and labour 
immigration. In these respects, the long-term significance of the 2002 election was 
considerable.  
 
The politicisation of labour immigration opened SAP to accusations of protectionism. The 
counter-argument was that labour immigration was used as an underhand device to 
undermine the Swedish model of the labour market, but SAP was very much on the defensive 
in the debate. The party was also criticised for bringing welfare concerns into the discussion. 
In 2004 when ten, mostly East European, countries were about to join the EU, SAP Prime 
Minister Göran Persson expressed concern about an influx of East European immigrants 
seeking to exploit the welfare system (Dagens Nyheter, 2004). The SAP government 
proposed transitional restrictions on immigration from the new EU countries, but following a 
breakdown of negotiations with the centre-right parties, Sweden became one of the few 
existing EU countries not to introduce such restrictions (Hinnfors et al 2012:592). In the 
debate about labour immigration the Green Party, which has a history of pragmatism on 
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labour market issues, became pivotal. In November 2008, the Greens reached an agreement 
with the centre-right government, which had taken office in 2006, to allow labour 
immigration (Riksdag & Departement 2008). The Green support was strictly speaking not 
necessary, as the centre right coalition commanded an outright majority between 2006 and 
2010, but it made the reform less vulnerable to future majority shifts.  
 
The co-operation between the Greens and the centre-right government continued with an 
agreement on refugee policy, announced in March 2011. The 2011 agreement contained 
relatively few concrete policy reforms, but did include more generous treatment of 
“paperless” refugees (i.e. without identity documents), for example the right to health care 
and the possibility for affected children to attend school. It also contained measures to 
facilitate family reunions for paperless refugees (Dagens Nyheter, 2011a; 2011b). An 
essential part of the background was that the Sweden Democrats had entered parliament in 
2010, and were in a pivotal position between the two blocs. The agreement between the 
government and the Greens thus prevented SD from potential influence in their profile issue.  
 
As should be apparent from the above, immigration has only rarely been high on the political 
agenda. This is also borne out in Table 1 below, which reports the priority of immigration, 
relative to sixteen other issue/problem areas for every year between 1987 and 2011. Despite 
being taken from different data source, as well as being calculated and reported in a different 
way, the data presented here are largely in line with the patterns reported by Odmalm 
(2011:1076). The proportions citing immigration as an important issue have fluctuated 
considerably over the years. In the non-election years 1990, 1992 and 1993, for example, 
immigration had very high priority – the 26 per cent citing immigration in 1993 is the highest 
proportion in the whole period.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The proportions then dropped sharply, but increased again in the 2000s. There have been 
significant fluctuations also after 2000. There is a tendency for immigration to have become 
somewhat more prioritised after the turn of the century. In contrast to the 1990s, however, the 
peaks after 2000 have been in election years; the above-discussed 2002, and 2010, when the 
Sweden Democrats broke through. Still, not even in those peak years immigration has been 
the top priority among the Swedish public. Except for 1993, never more than 1 in 5 
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respondents have put immigration among the up to three most important issues or problems. 
In the 2000s, the proportions have varied between 11 and 20 per cent. The average across the 
1987-2011 period is 14 per cent; the eighth highest of the 17 issue areas on which Table 1 is 
based. The highest overall averages are employment (32 per cent), health (28 per cent) and 
environment (23 per cent). Between 2000 and 2011 immigration was the sixth most 
prioritised issue. Thus, while immigration is not a top priority among voters, it is not an 
insignificant issue.  
 
3. The Swedish parties and immigration  
 
In this section the Swedish parties’ treatment of immigration in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 
elections will be analysed. The source will be the election manifestos which, although they do 
not provide an exhaustive account of a party’s positions and policies in every area, can be 
taken as valid indicators of the priority a party gives to a particular policy area, and the 
party’s key policy aims and positions in that area.1 
 
TABLE 2 HERE – ENTIRE PAGE IN LANDSCAPE FORMAT 
 
The Sweden Democrats is the only party to have devoted more than ten per cent of their 
election manifestos to immigration. Among the other parties, the greatest emphasis can be 
found in the Liberals and the Greens. The trends over time are declining for SAP and the Left 
Party, while the Green Party proportions are more stable. Across the centre-left in general, 
however, the overall decline is unambiguous. The trend for the centre-right is less clear-cut. 
The Christian Democrats made only brief references to immigration in 2002 and 2006, but 
the emphasis increased in 2010. There is an increase over time also in the Liberal Party, 
although it is not continuous. The Centre Party displays very low levels in all three elections. 
The overall centre-right trend is curvilinear or increasing, depending on what is included, but 
 
1 Swedish parties sometimes present joint manifestos with parties they intend to partner in 
government; either instead of their own manifesto, or in addition to it. Here 25 manifestos, 
joint and separate, are analysed. The prioritisation of immigration has been measured as the 
number of words in a manifesto with relevance to immigration and integration. Also 
references to ethnic discrimination, racism, etc., have been included. The unit of analysis is 
the words, but only whole sentences are included in the word count. Sections with 
immigration, refugee policy, etc., in the title have been included in their entirety. 
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the contrast to the unambiguous decline among the centre-left parties is clear. Election by 
election, the average was significantly higher for the centre-left than for the centre-right in 
2002, but this was reversed in 2006. In 2010 neither of the centre-left or centre-right 
manifestos devoted much space to immigration, but the proportion was somewhat higher in 
the latter document. The sizes of the differences between the centre-left and centre-right in 
2006 and 2010 depend on what is included in the comparison, but the main observation 
remains – the centre-left parties devoted more space to immigration in 2002, but the centre-
right parties did so in 2006 and 2010.  
 
Moving on to the substantive content, the fourth and fifth columns in Table 2 report whether 
a party seeks to change immigration policy in either direction. The criteria used are subjective 
to the respective parties, and relative to the situation as they saw it when the manifestos were 
written. Thus, advocacy of a more generous policy is indicated with a plus sign, while 
proposals of a less generous policy are indicated with a minus sign. Mere commitments to a 
“generous” or “humane” policy have been entered as neutral, symbolized with a zero, 
because no change is proposed. Unsurprisingly, the only party to argue that refugee 
immigration should be reduced is the Sweden Democrats. Advocacy of a more generous 
refugee policy is found mainly in the Left and Green parties. In 2002 the Left Party argued 
that “Sweden should have a more generous refugee policy” (Left Party 2002). This, the party 
argued four years later, could be achieved by abandoning the Treaty of Schengen (Left Party 
2006). In 2010, however, the Left Party is less specific: “our future vision is a society free of 
racism, and that Sweden has a humane and legally secure refugee policy which meets 
international conventions”. This has been entered in the table as neutral, as it does not 
explicitly advocate more generosity (Left Party, 2010). The Greens advocate more a more 
generous refugee policy in each manifesto, although with variations in the concrete proposals. 
In 2002 and 2006 the party proposed an amnesty to asylum seekers who have waited more 
than one year (Green Party, 2002; 2006). In 2010 the party argued for a more generous 
refugee policy in less specific terms, but in addition proposed an amnesty for paperless 
refugees (Green Party, 2010). The SAP reaction to the latter proposal was sceptical (Dagens 
Nyheter, 2010). Against this background, the centre-left manifesto presented in late August, 
some 2.5 weeks before the election, could be seen as a concession to the Greens. It did not go 
as far as the Greens had preferred, but it included a pledge to “strengthen” the protection of 
women, children and sexual minorities. This has been interpreted as meaning that the criteria 
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for such refugees should be made more generous, and entered as a plus sign in Table 2 
(Centre-left parties, 2010). 
 
The Social Democratic position has been influenced by the fact that the party was in 
government, and thus directly responsible for refugee policy, for long periods. In 2002, when 
the party was, and stayed, in office, the SAP manifesto argued that the refugee policy should 
be human, legally secure (rättssäker) and characterised by solidarity. The party does say that 
conditions for refugee children without parents should be improved, but without further 
specifications. Emphasis in the 2002 document was on faster and legally more secure 
handling of asylum applications, but without any specified commitment to a more generous 
policy, and has therefore been entered as neutral in Table 2 (Social Democrats, 2002). This 
position was largely repeated in 2006 (Social Democrats, 2006). The SAP document from 
2010, however, makes no reference to refugee immigration. Like SAP, the centre-right 
parties are reluctant to advocate more generous asylum policies. The Christian Democrats 
proposed in 2010 that the rights for children in the asylum process should be strengthened, 
and that local councils should be obliged to accept child refugees who arrive on their own 
(Christian Democrats, 2010). In the same year the Liberals advocated rights to health care 
and education for paperless refugees and their children (Liberal Party, 2010). The other 
centre-right manifestos, separate by party as well as the four-party documents from 2006 and 
2010, have similarities with the SAP documents from 2002 and 2006, with general 
commitments to the acceptance and human treatment of refugees, but without proposals to 
make the criteria more generous.  
 
It is the centre-right parties that mention labour immigration, and always in positive terms. 
The joint centre-right manifestos from 2006 and 2010, as well as the separate manifestos 
from the Centre and Liberal parties, explicitly advocate labour immigration (Centre Party, 
2006; 2010; Liberal Party, 2002a; 2010). The 2006 Liberal manifesto has a long section about 
integration, with proposals regarding immigrants and employment, but no specific reference 
to labour immigration. The fact that labour immigration had been re-introduced during the 
2006-2010 parliamentary term meant that the centre-right parties no longer advocated a more 
generous labour immigration policy; rather they argued for the retention of the recently 
introduced reform. This has still been entered as positive in Table 2. The Green Party, which 
supported the labour immigration reform by the centre-right government, does not mention 
this in any of the analysed manifestos. Neither does SAP or the Left Party, both of whom are 
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of course against the reform. The issue is also not mentioned in the centre-left manifesto from 
2010.  
 
The 2002 election highlighted demands, the penultimate column in Table 2. The view that 
immigrants should be encouraged to work instead of relying on benefits was not as such new. 
Nor was it only put forward by the Liberals; the Moderate manifesto from the same year 
stated that the party does not ”…accept a demand-free dependency on benefits, where the 
passivity of welfare authorities enable immigrants to over-utilise the welfare systems” 
(Moderate Party, 2002). Still, the 2002 election can be seen as a starting point, from where 
the “clarity” approach would be a common, recurring and explicit theme for the centre-right 
parties. The Liberals advocate various forms of demands in all three years; “jobs instead of 
benefits” (Liberal Party, 2002a), an obligation for immigrants to participate in training and 
development programmes (Liberal Party, 2006) and the statement that “everyone has the 
same responsibility to fend for themselves, irrespective of origin” (Liberal Party, 2010). The 
Centre Party manifestos from 2002 and 2006 also contain demands, while the Christian 
Democratic documents only do so once, in 2010. In the latter case the demands are fairly 
toned-down, for example that everybody in Sweden should have “the same rights, obligations 
and opportunities”, and the proposal of introductory information about the Swedish society 
for newly arrived immigrants, according to individual needs and abilities. These guarded 
wordings explain why the “yes” entry in the table has been put in brackets (Christian 
Democrats, 2010).  
 
The joint centre-right manifestos from 2006 and 2010 highlight alleged integration problems, 
but contain no explicit demands. The 2006 centre-right manifesto actually speaks against 
“more control of, or reduced benefits for, immigrants”. At the same time, the document 
argued that persons born outside Sweden are over-represented among criminals, which is “a 
social problem that must be taken seriously”. The proposed remedy was focused on the social 
causes of crime. The document also argued that foreign citizens who have committed serious 
crimes should in principle be expelled, but did not propose any formal changes (Centre-right 
parties, 2006). The 2010 centre-right document does not mention immigrant crime, but 
highlights immigrant unemployment. The proposed counter-measures are not phrased as 
demands, but rather as improved opportunities to get work, such as improved language 
training and increased incentives for employers to hire immigrants (Centre-right parties, 
2010). Thus, although the 2006 and 2010 documents highlight what is perceived as 
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integration problems the remedies are not formulated as demands, and have therefore been 
entered in Table 2 as “no” demands. 
 
On the centre-left, there is a divide between the Social Democrats and the other two parties. 
The SAP document from 2006 proposes a personalised establishment contract “based on 
clear rights and obligations” for all newly arrived refugees (Social Democrats, 2006). There 
is, however, no such proposal, or any kind of demand, in the SAP document from 2010, or in 
the joint centre-left manifesto from the same year. Both the latter documents state that it 
should be made easier for newly arrived immigrants to enter the labour market; the centre-left 
manifesto adds that language skills are of key importance (SAP, 2010; Centre-left parties, 
2010). In this respect, therefore, the SAP and joint centre-left manifestos from 2010 have 
similarities with the centre-right documents from 2006 and 2010. They all propose measures 
to improve the integration of immigrants to the labour market, but the proposed remedies are 
formulated as improved opportunities rather than demands. The Sweden Democrats have 
several demands in each manifesto. Immigrants without the need for protection, or the 
capacity to support themselves, will be returned to their countries of origin (Sweden 
Democrats, 2002; 2006); it is also stated that “immigrants should adapt to the Swedish 
society and not vice versa” (Sweden Democrats, 2006; 2010). 
 
The final column in Table 2 reports general value statements about immigration. These are 
statements for or against immigration, not based on material costs or benefits, but as a 
positive or negative value in and of itself. Such value statements are most common among the 
centre-right parties. The joint centre-right manifestos, for example, state that “we want to live 
in a society characterised by togetherness and diversity” (Centre-right parties, 2006), and that 
migrants “contribute with their experiences and knowledge in the recipient countries” 
(Centre-right parties, 2010). Elsewhere there is a tendency that parties making demands on 
immigrants also tend to make positive value statements about immigration. The Liberals, for 
example, argued in 2006 that “international solidarity and a humane refugee policy are 
cornerstones in the social liberal tradition”; and in 2010 that Sweden has been enriched by its 
openness to the surrounding world (Liberal Party, 2006; 2010). The Centre Party argues that 
“immigration contributes to an open and innovative society” (Centre Party, 2010), while the 
Christian Democrats state that “meetings between people of different backgrounds make 




Another pattern is that parties with strong views on immigration, either way, seem to 
consider value statements as superfluous. The Left and Green party documents contain 
several statements against racism and discrimination, but no principled statements for 
immigration. Conversely, only one out of the three analysed Sweden Democrat 
documents contains principled statements against immigration. The 2002 document is 
brief, basically containing the statement that immigration has been too high. In 2006, 
the party argues that immigration has caused “enormous economic, social and cultural 
problems”, and that multiculturalism is a serious threat against the cohesion that is a 
condition for the Swedish welfare model based on solidarity. This rhetoric is 
significantly toned down in 2010, when the SD manifesto contains a number of 
restrictive policy proposals, but the value statements are guarded, and not even uni-
directional. The party argues that freedom and openness are obvious Swedish values, 
but also that the Swedish cultural heritage, and the right for Swedes to develop their 
own culture on their own conditions, should be protected (Sweden Democrats, 2010). 
The SAP manifesto contained fairly far reaching value statements in 2002, but not in 
2006 or 2010 (Social Democrats, 2002; 2006; 2010). The centre-left manifesto from 
2010 contains no value statements (Centre-left parties, 2010). 
 
To sum up, a number of observations can be made. The first is almost trivial: there is a 
clear divide between the Sweden Democrats, on the one hand, and the seven other 
parties, on the other. A second observation concerns the mainstream parties’ responses 
to the rise of SD. For the centre-left parties the trend over time is unequivocal; the 
relative space devoted to immigration was highest in 2002, when SD was still a fringe 
party. It sank in 2006, when SD was growing stronger but still some way from a 
breakthrough. It sank even further in 2010, when the likelihood of an SD breakthrough 
was high. For the centre-right parties the development over time is less clear-cut, and 
depends on whether the separate or joint manifestos are taken into account. Comparing 
the latter documents, however, the relative centre-right emphasis on immigration was 
lower in 2010 than in 2006. Thus, the response from the mainstream parties to the 
growth of SD was not to increase their attention to immigration – there is some, albeit 




Nor can it be argued that the mainstream parties changed their positions on 
immigration in response to the growth of SD. The view of the Liberal Party has been 
clear throughout the 2002-2010 period – in principle lauding the benefits from 
immigration, but with an additional and significant element of demands, or “clarity”. 
The same can, largely, be said of the Centre Party, which devotes less space to 
immigration than the Liberals, but with similar policy and value positions. The Christian 
Democrats are more reluctant to make demands on immigrants, and do not explicitly 
support labour immigration (although the party has stood by the labour immigration 
reform agreed in 2008). The Moderate Party presented a separate manifesto only in 
2002, a document which was similar to the Centre and Liberal manifestos. Also the joint 
centre-right manifestos from 2006 and 2010 fit with the overall centre-right pattern, in 
terms of overall outlook as well as policy aims. On the whole, therefore, the centre-right 
documents are characterised by similarity and stability.  
 
There is more diversity on the centre-left. An obvious example, discussed earlier, is 
labour immigration, which separates the Greens from the other two centre-left parties. 
In terms of refugee immigration the odd party out is the Social Democrats, who are also 
the only centre-left party to have attached demands to the proposed immigration policy. 
In fact, it is possible to observe a development towards more restrictiveness in the SAP 
manifestos from 2002 to 2006; positive value statements appear in the former 
document but not in the latter; while demands appear in the latter but not in the former. 
This trend could be linked to the fact that support for SD grew between 2002 and 2006, 
not least in terms of local council seats. On the other hand the SAP document from 2010 
– when SD was much stronger – significantly toned down immigration. The analysis of 
SAP documents is nevertheless largely in line with Hinnfors and colleagues who, on the 
basis of a more long-term analysis, conclude that “SAP has consistently favoured more 
restrictive policies”, in terms of labour as well as refugee immigration (Hinnfors et al. 
2012; quote from page 599). The Left and Green documents display no trends in any 
direction. Neither party puts any demands on immigrants. The rather watered-down, 
and brief, passages on immigration in the joint centre-left manifesto from 2010 can thus 






It is clear that immigration is a difficult issue for the Swedish mainstream parties. Their 
self-image as generous is not necessarily insincere as such, but it does hide underlying 
tensions. This is particularly evident on the centre-left. The Social Democrats are more 
restrictive than the other two parties on refugee policy. In addition, although it does not 
show in the election manifestos, the Greens are more liberal than the other two on 
labour immigration. There is more prima facie coherence on the centre-right, but also 
here latent divisions can be detected. The analysis of the party manifestos indicate that 
the Christian Democrats deviate somewhat from the other three on refugee 
immigration. In the recent public debate there have, furthermore, been indications that 
the Moderate Party is more restrictive than the other centre-right parties. The Moderate 
position has also at times threatened to undermine the relations with the Greens (see, 
e.g., Dagens Nyheter, 2013). In terms of labour immigration, the situation is slightly 
different. Here, the centre-right parties are united, they have pursued the issue, and 
they bring it up in their manifestos. The centre-left parties have not done so, even 
though their policy positions are clear – SAP and the Left Party are opposed, while the 
Greens are in favour. An obvious reason why the centre-left parties seek to play down 
the issue is of course that they are split, but it is a difficult issue for them also in other 
ways. The issue of labour immigration highlights the “Swedish Model” on the labour 
market, the role of trade unions and the rights and conditions for Swedish workers, and 
should therefore suit SAP and the Left Party. There are, however, reasons why this is 
not the case.  
 
One is internal, and applies primarily to SAP. Labour market issues increasingly have an 
international dimension, and a debate about the Swedish labour market, and its 
openness to foreign workers and companies, will almost certainly open up old wounds 
in the EU-divided SAP (compare Woolfson et al., 2010). Second, it will be difficult to 
confine the debate to the economic left-right dimension. What defenders of the 
“Swedish model” view as protection of a stable labour market and safe working 
conditions, critics regard as nationalistic egoism in a globalised world. In such a debate 
climate, accusations of intolerance and protectionism are never far away, especially as 
the Sweden Democrats are certain to appear on the same side in the debate as SAP and 
the Left Party. A third problem is that the Green position makes the battle about labour 
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immigration more or less unwinnable for SAP and the Left Party, as the likelihood of a 
future election producing an outright SAP-Left Party majority is very small. The only 
possible solution would be to turn to the Sweden Democrats – an unthinkable option for 
both parties.  
 
The evidence presented gives some, albeit qualified, support for two of the three 
hypotheses presented in the introductory article to this special issue. The fact that the 
centre-left parties, who are split on immigration, de-emphasised the issue between 
2002 and 2010 is in line with hypothesis 1 (parties emphasise immigration if they agree 
on the issue) and 3 (parties divert attention away from immigration if they cannot 
resolve ideological tensions from it). The fact that the centre-right parties did not 
significantly increase their emphasis on immigration during the same period could be 
said to point in the same direction. As just mentioned, there are latent inter-party 
tensions also on the centre-right, although not as serious as on the centre-left. 
Regarding hypothesis 2 (parties will downplay immigration if they are not trusted by 
voters on the issue), the evidence is contradictory. Of the two parties with the highest 
levels of trust on immigration, the Liberals increased their emphasis on the issue over 
time, while the Social Democrats went in the opposite direction.  
 
It seems clear, therefore, that immigration will continue to cause problems for the 
mainstream parties. The growth of the Sweden Democrats is a contributory factor, but 
not the core reason. The underlying tensions about refugee as well as labour 
immigration can be traced back to when SD was far from being a potent threat. The 
difference is that it was easier to avoid open conflicts about the issue when there was no 
SD – the New Democracy interlude was brief. The Sweden Democrats are unlikely to 
disappear as quickly, and will do what they can to keep immigration on the agenda. The 
open and latent divisions among the mainstream parties will not go away, and the 
future political development could mean that they will be increasingly exposed. The 
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Table 1. Prioritisation of immigration among Swedes, 1987-2011. Per cent respondents 
naming “immigrants/refugees” as one of the most important “issue(s) or societal problems”, 
and the ranking of immigration among seventeen issue/problem areas. Election years in bold. 
 
Year Per cent Rank 
1987 7 10 
1988 8 9 
1989 11 7 
1990 14 4 
1991 13 8 
1992 19 4 
1993 26 3 
1994 12 7 
1995 14 6 
1996 13 6 
1997 10 7 
1998 10 8 
1999 12 6 
2000 11 6 
2001 13 5 
2002 20 4 
2003 12 6 
2004 11 7 
2005 15 6 
2006 15 5 
2007 14 7 
2008 13 8 
2009 15 5 
2010 19 4 
2011 14 8 
 
Comment: Based on Weibull et al. 2012:42. Data are from the SOM postal surveys, conducted by Göteborg 
University (www.som.gu.se). The question is open-ended, with the wording “Which issue(s) or societal 
problem(s) do you think is/are the most important in Sweden today? Indicate at most three issues/problems”. 
Entries indicate the proportions of respondents mentioning “immigrants/refugees” as one of the up to three 
issues or problems. The “rank” column reports the ranking of “immigrants/refugees” out of seventeen 
issue/problem areas. Numbers of respondents vary between 1,573 (1991) and 5,007 (2010). 
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Table 2. Immigration and related issues in Swedish parties’ election manifestos, 2002-2010. 
  Total no. 
of words 








Value statements on 
immigration 
SAP 2002 2,897 189 (6.5) 0 0 No 2 positive 
SAP 2006 4,145 153 (3.7) 0 0 Yes 0 
SAP 2010 2,543 41 (1.7) 0 0 No 0 
V 2002 5,683 478 (8.4) + 0 No 0 
V 2006 3,272 70 (2.1) + 0 No 0 
V 2010 2,010 20 (1.0) 0 0 No 0 
MP 2002 1,479 88 (5.9) + 0 No 0 
MP 2006 1,847 93 (5.0) + 0 No 0 
MP 2010 2,464 163 (6.6) + 0 No 0 
Centre-left 2010 4,800 93 (1.9) + 0 No 0 
C 2002 2,614 61 (2.3) 0 0 Yes 1 positive 
C 2006 4,390 139 (2.9) 0 + Yes 2 positive 
C 2010 7,082 36 (0.5) 0 + No 1 positive 
FP 2002 5,736 316 (5.5) 0 + Yes 1 positive 
FP 2006 15,600 1,357 (8.7) 0 0 Yes 0 
FP 2010 9,800 840 (8.6) + + Yes 1 positive 
KD 2002 4,671 46 (1.0) 0 0 No 0 
KD 2006 2,125 22 (1.0) 0 0 No 0 
KD 2010 3,365 263 (7.8) + 0 (Yes) 1 positive 
M 2002 5,744 246 (4.3) 0 0 Yes 0 
Centre-right 2006 11,100 638 (5.7) 0 + No 1 positive 
Centre-right 2010 17,000 602 (3.5) 0 + No 1 positive 
SD 2002 755 99 (13.1) - 0 Yes 0 
SD 2006 1,664 336 (20.2) - 0 Yes 2 negative 
SD 2010 1,800 217 (12.0) - - Yes 0 
Comment: SAP = Social Democrats; V = Left Party; MP = Green Party; Centre-left = SAP+V+MP; C = Centre Party; FP = Liberal Party; KD = Christian Democrats; M = Moderate Party; 
Centre-right = C+FP+KD+M. (+) = advocacy of more generous policy; (-) = advocacy of more restrictive policy; 0 = neutral position, or issue not mentioned. Brackets indicate borderline cases. 
In 2006 and 2010, M did not present separate manifestos. 
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Figure 1. Indicators of non-Nordic immigration in Sweden, 1985-2013. Percentages of total Swedish population. 
 
 
Comment: Nordic refers to Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway (and Sweden). Immigrants born in, and/or citizens of, all other countries are 
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